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RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENcE -

"FRUIT
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DOCTRINE

HELD NOT TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF EYEWITNESS WHOSE
IDENTITY WAS OBTAINED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION. - The
defendants, whose convictions of murder and robbery rested primarily on the testimony of an eyewitness, sought reversal of their
convictions on the ground that the testimony of the eyewitness
should be suppressed because his existence and identity were the
"fruit" of questioning the defendants during a per.io4 of illegal
detention. The alleged illegality resulted from an initial arrest
on suspicion and the subsequent questioning of the defendants for
sixty hours before arraignment. The Court affirmed the convictions and held that, although the written and oral confessions
made during the illegal detention period were inadmissible, the
testimony of the eyewitness need not be suppressed because there
had been no violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process,
and the defendants' constitutional rights had been adequately
protected. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
The traditional view maintained that evidence, if pertinent to
an issue, was admissible regardless of the manner in which it
was obtained.'
Despite the logic of such a rule, it has been
qualified, at least in the federal courts, by far-reaching exceptions,
one of which concerns evidence secured in violation of the prompt
arraignment requirement of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 The McNabb-Mallory rule, a name for the body of
case law concerned with this problem, actually involves two rules,
one of procedure and one of evidence.
With respect to the rule of procedure, Rule 5(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies that arrested persons
are to be brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay.3 It is only when this rule of procedure is violated
18 WIGMORE,

EVinFDNCE § 2183 (rev. ed. 1961).
2 FED. R. CRim. P. 5(a).
3Ibid. This rule provides: "An officer making an arrest under a
warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without
a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before
the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer

empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of

the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought
before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith."
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that the rule of evidence suppressing confessions obtained during
an unnecessary delay becomes operative.
Prior to McNabb v. United States,4 involuntary confessions
were excluded as a violation of the constitutional guarantee of due
process. 5 In McNabb the United States Supreme Court exercising
its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts, announced an additional rule of exclusion
which did not arise from constitutional sources. 6 The Court held
that any confession obtained during a period of detention male
illegal by an unnecessary delay in arraignment was to be excluded.
The facts in McNabb .were not as broad as the rule stated, because
of the defendants' illiteracy and lack of experience, so that the
application of the rule was left in doubt. The new rule was
difficult to apply because of this lack of clarity. A study of
the early cases interpreting McNabb discloses that the courts
advanced three different positions: (1) voluntariness was the sole
basis of determining the admissibility of a confession; however,
delay in arraignment was a factor to be considered in assessing
its voluntariness; 7 (2) any confession procured in the course of
a detention which later became illegal was inadmissible;8 and
(3) any confession obtained prior to arraignment was inadmissible. 9
As a result of this confusion, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Mitchell v. United States 10 in order to re-evaluate
4318 U.S. 332 (1943).

5 E.g., Purpura v. United States, 262 Fed. 473 (4th Cir. 1919); People
v. Heide, 302 Ill. 6?4, 135 N.E. 77 (1922).
6The Court stated that "the principles governing the admissibility of
evidence in federal criminal trials have not been restricted . . . to those
derived solely from the Constitution." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 341 (1943).
From the very beginning of its history the Court
formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions.
E.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 643-44 (1818); see 1 WIGMORE, EvmErcE

§ 6 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Rules of Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials,

47 H.Av. L. REV. 853 (1934).
7 Accord, United States v. Grote, 140 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1944).
Those
courts which subscribed to this version of the McNabb rule emphasized
the fact that the Court painstakingly detailed all the unpleasant circumstances
of the McNabbs' detention: the barren cell, the prolonged interrogation,
the isolation from friends. See Gros v. United States, 136 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1943).
8 This was the interpretation first given to the McNabb rule in the
jurisdiction which it most affected. Mitchell v. United States, 138 F.2d
426 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
9 This reading of McNabb was put forward in United States v. Haupt,
136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943). It contradicts the Supreme Court's statement
in the McNabb case that the "mere fact that a confession was made
while in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible." McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 346 (1943).
10322 U.S. 65 (1943).

194]

RECENT DECISIONS

the McNabb rule and to define it more clearly. In the Mitchell
case, the issue was whether a confession given almost simultaneously
with arrest was to be suppressed if the police illegally detained the
defendant after the confession had been secured. The Court held
that if the detention was legal at the time of the confession,
subsequent illegal delay in arraignment would not contaminate it.
This decision ended two misconceptions of McNabb; it squarely
held that only confessions obtained during the illegal portion of
the detention are objectionable, and, a fortiori, it made clear that
the new rule did not ban all pre-arraignment confessions. In
Upshaw v. United States,' the confession was not procured
until long after the detention had become illegal. Mr. Justice
Black, writing the majority opinion, eliminated another of the
possible interpretations when he redefined the McNabb rule
as follows:
"A confession is inadmissible if made during
illegal detention due to failure promptly to carry a prisoner
before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is
the result of torture, physical or psychological ...
" 12
In
effect this statement of the rule meant that given the concurrence
of unlawful detention and a confession, -the former contaminates
the latter.
In order to remove time-honored police investigative practice
from the impact of the now clearly defined McNabb rule, the
emphasis shifted to a determination of when a detention becomes
illegal. In the period between the Upshaw case and the sub3
sequent decision in Mallory v. United States,"
the lower federal
courts directed ever-increasing attention toward the wording of
rule 5(a). This re-examination revealed one inviting method of
checking the influence of the McNabb rule, since rule 5(a) did
not specify that an accused be arraigned "forthwith" or "immediately," but only required that he be presented to the magistrate
"without unnecessary delay."
Subsequent cases turned on the
question of when a delay is a necessary one. There are four
types of delays which were classified as necessary: (1) delay
occasioned by the "booking" procedure at the precinct station;
(2) delay resulting when an arrest occurs late in the afternoon
or after the regular office hours of the committing magistrate;14
(3) delay caused by police investigative procedures other than
an attempt to interrogate the prisoner; 15 and (4) delay resulting
from the desire to interrogate the prisoner.16
1335 U.S. 410 (1948).

12 Id.at

413.

13 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

14 See, e.g., Pixley v. United States, 220 F.2d 912 (16th Cir. 1955);
Allen v. United States, 202 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
'5 See Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1951).
16 See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 234 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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In Mallory 17 the Supreme Court for the first time passed
directly on the question of what constituted an unnecessary delay
within the meaning of rule 5(a). After his arrest on suspicion
of a capital offense, the defendant, a nineteen year-old boy of
limited intelligence, without being informed of his rights, was
iquestioned by police, given a lie detector test and not arraigned
until he had confessed, although arraignment easily could have
been effected. The Court unanimously held that such an arraignment was not "without unnecessary delay" and clearly outlawed
one type of delay-that which was solely for purposes of interrogation. 18 Just as clearly, dictum in the case approved a delay
long enough to permit the police to take their prisoner through
a booking procedure at the precinct office. 19 This final clarification of the McNabb rule would benefit the defendant by preserving the substance of the accusatorial system of criminal justice
while protecting his rights from infringement.
In the cases construing McNabb, the issue revolved around
the admissibility of confessions obtained during a period of
illegal detention. Since confessions were clearly excluded, the
only further means of circumventing McNabb was to maintain
that it did not require that all evidence obtained during a period
of illegal detention be excluded. The first leading case which
attempted to determine what evidence other than confessions
20
was barred by violation of rule 5 (a) was Watson v. United States.
The court there held that in addition to a confession, a re-enactment
of the crime and the turning over of clothing to the police were
also the result of the defendant's illegal detention and as such
were excluded from evidence. In Payne v. United States,21 the
victim had identified the defendant in a police line-up during an
illegal detention and later as a witness at the trial. The court
stated that the witness could identify the defendant in court even
though the identification at police headquarters was barred because
it occurred during a period of illegal detention. The court refused
to recognize the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument since the
consequence of accepting that argument would forever preclude
the victim from testifying. The court considered the rights of the
accused as adequately protected in such a case when "the complaining witnesT takes the stand in open court, for examination
and cross-examination." 22
While in Watson the issue dealt with evidence directly secured
during the illegal detention, subsequent cases presented the question
17 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
18 Id. at 454.
19 Ibid.
20 249 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
21294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
22
Id. at 727.
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of the admissibility of evidence secured indirectly during an illegal
detention. In Bynum v. United States,23 the defendant's fingerprints were secured during a period of illegal questioning and were
subsequently used to identify the defendant. The court stated
that the prosecution could not introduce the set of illegally obtained
fingerprints, but could introduce a second set which were obtained
subsequent to the time when the detention became legal. Thus,
the court had taken a further step in the trend away from the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine by admitting the evidence
despite the fact that it was tainted with some illegality.
In a more recent case, Wong Sun v. United States,24 the
Supreme Court seemed to return to its previous adherence to the
strict interpretation of the exclusionary rule. While the case
was not concerned with a question of illegal detention, the Court
held that narcotics as evidence were inadmissible as "poisoned
fruit" because the police learned of their possessor from an
illegally arrested third party. The Court again announced a
rule similar to the earlier "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
and stated that the more appropriate question in a case such
as this is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' 25
The Court in the instant case, however, reverted to its position
in the Bynum case and held that the testimony of an eyewitness,
whose existence and identity were learned of from the defendants
during a period of illegal detention, was not inadmissible because
of a violation of rule 5(a). The Court based its holding on
the nature of the information obtained, and noted that the identity
of a witness is of no evidentiary value per se. The evidentiary
value lies in the witness' testimony, and such testimony is determined
by the interaction of such attributes as "will, perception, memory
The majority removes the oral testimony
and volition .... ,"12
of a witness from the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine by
reasoning that the decision of the witness as to what testimony
ie will give is a voluntary act which erases the taint of the
original illegality. It is this uniqueness of the human process
which distinguishes the evidentiary character of a witness from
the relative immutability of inanimate evidence.
Chief Judge Bazelon, in his dissenting opinion, would exclude
the witness' testimony as the "fruit" or "product" of the illegal
detention, a fact "determined in the light of the need to discourage
23262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24371 U.S. 471 (1963).
25
Id. at 488.
26 Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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violation of the Rule." 27 The dissenting opinion would interpret
the evidence in the light of the exclusionary rule as set down
in the Wong Sun case. The taint of the original illegality would
not be removed under this rationale because the link between the
information illegally obtained from the defendants and the testimony
of the eyewitness would not be attenuated.
The importance of the Smith case lies in its attempt to circumvent the McNabb-Mallory rule by rejecting the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. Unlike the Payne case, where the witness'
identity was known by means other than information obtained during
an illegal detention, the Smith case seems to negate the policy
behind McNabb. While the Court makes a valid distinction
between the evidentiary value of living witnesses and inanimate
evidence, it fails to take into consideration the fact of the direct
link between the witness' testimony and the illegal questioning
of the defendants. The witness' testimony, upon which the convictions rested, would have been unavailable to the police, since
they were not even aware of his existence and identity, except
for the information obtained from the defendants. The dissent
appears to be more cognizant of the need to discourage violation of
McNabb, and more aware of the direct link between the testimony
and the illegal questioning. The majority decision in the Smith
case would seem to indicate an attempt to circumvent the rule
laid down by the Supreme Court in the Wong Sun case, an attempt
not unlike the earlier attempts of the lower federal courts to avoid
the obvious effects of applying the McNabb rule. The Court,
while apparently deciding the case on the basis of the probative
evidence rule, seems to have lost view of the ultimate purpose of
the exclusionary rule, to administer justice by fair and legal
means.
The McNabb rule, an exclusionary rule of evidence for the
federal courts28 arising out of the violation of rule 5(a), has
undergone much examination and clarification since it was first
announced by the Supreme Court. The present case is notable
as another step in the continual effort to define the broad, general
terms of the rule. Since most of the terms have been made explicit
in earlier decisions, this case is important in determining the
scope of the evidence which the rule is meant to exclude. The
27

Id.at 884.

28The federal rule is not binding on state courts and does not apply to

state criminal trials. New York has refused to adopt the federal rule.
See, e.g., People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556, 225 N.Y.S.2d
193, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962) ; People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347,

179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961). However, the rule in New York
as to the admissibility of confessions obtained prior to arraignment seems
to be undergoing change. See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d
628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
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apparent conflict between the Smith case and prior decisions of
the Supreme Court on this question of excluded evidence may
result in the need for further clarification by the Supreme Court
of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The reasoning behind
the Smith case presents a novel approach to the evidentiary value
of information procured during an illegal detention and may
provide a new basis for determining whether or not particular
forms of evidence fall within the exclusionary rule.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION - ABSTENTION DOCTRINE - RETURN TO
DISTRICT COURT PRECLUDED WHEN FEDERAL CLAIM UNRESERVEDLY
SUBMITTED TO STATE COURT. - Appellants, graduates of chiro-

practic schools, sought to practice without complying with the
requirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act.' They brought
an action in the federal district court 2 for an injunction and
declaration that the act as applied to them was unconstitutional.
The court, sua sponte, invoked the doctrine of abstention and
referred the parties to the state courts since the question presented
involved a principle of Louisiana law not yet decided by that
state. The claims were unreservedly submitted to the state court
and after final judgment was entered against the appellants they
attempted to return to the district court. Respondent's motion
to dismiss was granted by the district court on the ground of
res judicata. 3 On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and held that a litigant foregoes his right under the
abstention doctrine to return to the district court by unreservedly
submitting his federal claims to the state courts. However, this
rule was not applied against the appellants because they had
reasonably relied on the mistaken view that they were required
to litigate their federal claims in the state courts. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
The doctrine of abstention, a court-made rule, is a comparatively
new concept in federal jurisdiction. 4 The doctrine as applied
ILA. RFv. STAT. ANN.

§§37:1261-1290 (1950).

2 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 F. Supp.
121 (E.D. La. 1960).
3 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La. 1961), rezfd, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
4 For treatments of the abstention doctrine, see 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 64 (1960) ; IA

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 0.203 (2d ed. 1961); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered. 37

TEXAs L. REV. 815 (1959); Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal
Court, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1358 (1960); Note, Judicial Abstention From The
Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749 (1959): Note,
Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).

